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Abstract
Alternative design/alternative bids (ADAB) provides a mechanism for the asphalt and concrete paving
industries to compete for the same paving project. It operates on the principle of the market pricing of each
material determining which is most economical when the bids are opened, rather than selecting the pavement
type during design based on a life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA). This paper reviews including LCC-based bid
adjustment factors in the ADAB award decision. Data are from a survey that received responses from 40 U.S.
Departments of Transportation (DOT) and the Canadian province of Ontario, and a content analysis of 55
ADAB project outcomes in 13 U.S. states and three Canadian provinces. Seven algorithms in use to calculate
an ADAB bid adjustment factor were found, and six U.S. DOTs that award ADAB projects without an
adjustment factor. The paper finds that the adjustment factor formula rarely influences the award decision and,
generally, the pavement type with the lowest bid cost wins with or without the adjustment factor. The paper
models the ADAB process in financial terms as an exercisable commodity option that accrues value from the
differential rates of volatility between asphalt and concrete. It concludes that an LCC-based bid adjustment
factor complicates the award process, creating potential for controversy over what the factor inputs are, and
does not add value over bidding the pavement types head to head and awarding to the low bidder. The ADAB
process increases the number of bidders and reduces unit bid prices for both pavement types.
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Selecting the pavement type for a highway construction proj-
ect is a decision that transcends the technical design process. 
It has become increasingly controversial over the past sev-
eral decades as the asphalt and concrete paving industries 
fight for market share by trying to influence the decisions 
made by public officials on fundamental highway design. 
The issue is made more contentious by the persistent percep-
tion by both engineers and non-engineers that is expressed 
succinctly by a quote from Suvo and Stonecypher: “Concrete 
roads are highly durable and more environmentally friendly 
as compared to asphalt roads. However, asphalt paving costs 
far less than concrete paving” (1). The fight spilled out of the 
technical realm and into the financial realm when the FHWA 
promoted the use of life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA) as the 
means to determine the most economical pavement type dur-
ing the design process (2). The quest for the most economical 
solution eventually led to the development of alternative 
design/alternative bids (ADAB) as a means of providing a 
mechanism to allow both industries to compete for the same 
project (3). However, even when both materials are available 
as acceptable options, the controversy over the means for 
selecting the winning bidder remains because the generally 
accepted approach is to develop an LCC adjustment factor 
that is applied to the bid price for the asphalt, and sometimes 
also the concrete bid, to account for the difference in service 
lives and maintenance costs.
The objective of this paper is to detail the state of the prac-
tice regarding ADAB and LCC adjustment factors, and then 
discuss the technical and financial advantages and disadvan-
tages of the LCC adjustment factor in ADAB bidding. The 
information provided comes from a 2016 NCHRP study on 
the topic which drew survey responses and case studies from 
40 U.S. state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) and the 
Ministry of Transportation of the Canadian province of 
Ontario (MTO). The study identified seven different formulae 
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for calculating the LCC adjustment factor and identified six 
DOTs that bid hot-mix asphalt (HMA) and Portland cement 
concrete (PCC) pavement types head to head without an LCC 
adjustment factor. Lastly, the paper posits that although the 
philosophy of LCCA-based pavement design decisions is cer-
tainly intuitive, the practice is far from standardized, as seen 
from the seven different LCC adjustment algorithms, and that 
the volume of LCCA research indicates that LCC is highly 
sensitive to the input assumptions made for variables, like the 
discount rate, the period of analysis, and the residual (sal-
vage) value for the pavement type with the longer life (2, 4, 
5). These facts make one question the utility of the LCC 
adjustment factor itself in the ADAB bidding process, consid-
ering the well-documented continuing controversy over 
appropriate input values (4–6).
Background
NCHRP Synthesis 499: Alternate Design/Alternate Bid 
Process for Pavement-Type Selection concluded the follow-
ing about ADAB practices:
Alternate Design/Alternate Bid (ADAB) allows the pavement-
type selection decision to be made as part of the procurement 
process by permitting contractors to bid their preferred alternative 
using real-time market pricing for the paving materials. This 
synthesis found that many ADAB projects documented an 
increased number of bidders on a given paving project by 
allowing both the asphalt and concrete paving industries to 
compete. ADAB projects also document a general trend of 
overall bid unit price reduction for both pavement types. (3)
FHWA Technical Advisory T 5040.39: Use of Alternate 
Bidding for Pavement-Type Selection (7) defines ADAB as a 
procurement in which two or more equivalent pavement 
designs are furnished, allowing the marketplace to determine 
the most economic pavement type based on real-time pricing 
for both alternatives at the time of letting. The Technical 
Advisory advises that ADAB is “a suitable approach for 
determining pavement type when engineering and economic 
analysis does not indicate a clear choice between different 
pavement designs” (7) Synthesis 499 also found that many 
agencies that use ADAB have established a criterion for the 
relative values of asphalt and concrete pavement LCCs, such 
as being within a given percentage of each other, as the trig-
ger for implementing ADAB on a given project (3). The syn-
thesis found that the cost of preparing two sets of equivalent 
designs was trivial. In fact, the Indiana DOT calculated a 
saving of $3.8 million on nine ADAB projects, which yields 
a benefit cost ratio of 11.4 for the additional fee paid to its 
design consultants for the extra pavement design (8).
Lastly, Synthesis 499 found that “implementing ADAB 
contracts can lead to increased competition and reduced 
pavement material costs” (3). The Missouri DOT reported an 
average increase of two more bidders per letting, and a 5% to 
8% decrease in price in asphalt and concrete paving prices in 
over 187 lettings. The Indiana, Louisiana, and Michigan 
DOTs all reported a decrease in pricing on their ADAB proj-
ects when compared with conventional paving projects. The 
Portland Cement Association maintains ADAB “gives the 
contractor a choice to bid on either a concrete or an asphalt 
option, thereby increasing the number of bidders on each job 
and enhancing competition” (9).
Impact of Construction Material Price Volatility
The difference between classical LCCA and the develop-
ment of ADAB LCC adjustment factors has to do with the 
timing of the pricing data. FHWA provides guidance for 
LCCA that is intended to compare the total whole life costs 
of design alternatives to make the pavement-type selection 
decision (2). The FHWA LCCA primer maintains that con-
struction costs are only a part of the analysis and it provides 
a method for comparing the life-cycle costs and benefits of 
possible pavement design alternatives (10). Typical pave-
ment includes costs for design, construction, maintenance, 
rehabilitation, and user costs over a period of analysis span-
ning at least one major rehabilitation (11). However, this 
analysis is conducted using estimate prices for costs that will 
all occur several years in the future after the project is 
awarded. Therefore, estimates for material price escalation 
must also be made, and this is when volatility in the con-
struction materials market can affect actual costs.
The term “price escalation” denotes an inherent bias to 
inflate all future costs as a conservative measure to keep the 
project’s budget sufficient to allow an award as scheduled. 
This philosophy unintentionally eliminates the ability to 
accrue savings as a result of deflation in one commodity ver-
sus its competing alternate. Figure 1 shows the differential 
changes in liquid asphalt and Portland cement commodity 
prices over the period of January 2004 to June 2017 (12). 
The figure shows that during the period from June 1, 2008 to 
December 1, 2008 that asphalt’s commodity price experi-
enced a swing of 16% (+11% in June to −5% in December). 
In the same period, cement’s volatility was only about 2%. In 
the first 5 months of 2017, the asphalt volatility ran from 
+8% to −5% with cement running from +3% to −1%.
Figure 2 shows the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis’ 
asphalt and Portland cement indexes over the same period 
(12). Although the two metrics are not calibrated to one 
another, they have been graphed in juxtaposition to provide a 
visual representation of how they have moved with respect to 
each other over the same period as the commodity prices 
shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 appears to indicate a slight trend 
to the two indexes changing in opposition to each other. In 
other words, when asphalt goes up, cement goes down, and 
vice versa. The information provided in the figures leads to 
two conclusions. First, making pavement-type selection 
decisions with LCCA based on pricing assumptions estab-
lished years before letting, and escalated at some fixed dis-
count rate to the future, is an exercise in futility. The 
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conventional perception that “asphalt paving costs far less 
than concrete” (1) is faulty. Second, by selecting a pavement 
type before the day of letting, the agency is giving up the 
opportunity for cost savings accrued from a favorable swing 
in the relative prices of the two pavement types in the com-
modities market.
Whereas vast volumes of forward and futures contracts 
are traded daily on commodity exchanges to profit from the 
types of volatilities described above, similar hedging strate-
gies are not common in construction projects. For instance, 
the daily trading volume for West Texas Intermediate futures, 
which could be used to hedge exposures to asphalt prices in 
a pavement project, is over $50 billion (13).
The price volatility of different construction inputs under 
varying pavement-type designs creates the so-called option 
value, as it is referred to in the finance literature (14). In fact, 
deferring the timing of the pavement-type selection decision to 
test the market prices of competing design alternatives would 
be described as “deferment (learning) real options” (15). 
Thus, once the value embedded in the ADAB practices is rec-
ognized as option values (i.e., potential cost savings from 
allowing alternative design proposals to compete based on 
Figure 1. Pavement type volatility (12).
Figure 2. Relative change in asphalt and Portland cement indexes (12).
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market conditions), the decision of whether to employ ADAB 
is merely a decision on the timing of when the agency’s option 
is exercised. That is, selecting the final pavement type during 
design exercises the agency’s option and forgoes the possibility 
of accruing benefits by exercising its option at letting by using 
ADAB. According to one author: “Bidding pavements ‘head-
to-head’ allows the open market to determine what is con-
structed … not outdated assumptions made during the 
[pavement-type] evaluation/selection process years before let-
ting” (16). The Missouri DOT made the decision to employ 
ADAB on all projects that exceeded 7,500 yd2 of paved surface 
in 1996 (17). By doing so the Missouri DOT made the business 
decision to exercise its pavement material option as late as 
practical and, as will be discussed later in the paper, accrued 
substantial benefits as a result.
Methodology
The information contained in this paper was extracted from 
NCHRP Synthesis 499 (3). That broader effort collected sur-
vey data from 40 U.S. state DOTs (an 80% response rate), 
case studies from five U.S. state DOTs and the MTO in 
Canada, as well as a content analysis of the research 
literature on the topic. This paper goes on to prepare a 
detailed analysis of the LCC adjustment factor’s impact on 
the pavement-type selection for a typical ADAB project to 
establish a conclusion on the utility of those factors in the 
overall process. The paper answers the following research 
question:
Does the inclusion of a LCC adjustment factor in the algorithm 
for determining the most economical bid price add value to the 
procedure?
Table 1 shows the options found in NCHRP Synthesis 499 
(3) that are used by DOTs to calculate a rational LCC adjust-
ment factor. It is important to note that there seems to be no 
single uniform method for accounting for the difference in 
pavement-type service lives, post-construction operations 
and maintenance costs, or the amount of disruption the pub-
lic will experience during construction. In addition to the 
various adjustment factor options, the survey found that six 
states apply ADAB without adjusting the bid pricing and rely 
on direct competition between the pavement types.
One of the major differences that can be observed in Table 
1 is a difference in philosophy as to just how the LCC 
Table 1. LCC-Based Bid Adjustment Factor Summary (3)
Name Formula Highway agencies
A + C bidding; C applied to 
HMA only
HMA bid = HMA contract bid amount + NPW of future HMA rehab
PCC bid = PCC contract bid amount
Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma
A + C bidding; C applied 
to both
HMA bid = HMA contract bid amount + NPW of future HMA rehab
PCC bid = PCC contract bid amount + NPW of future PCC rehab
Indiana, Kentucky
A + B + C bidding HMA bid = HMA contract bid amount + value of time + NPW of future 
HMA rehab
PCC bid = PCC contract bid amount + value of time + NPW of future 
PCC rehab
Kentucky, Louisiana
A + C + lane rental HMA EUAC = HMA contract bid amount + lane rental + future HMA 
maintenance costs (capital recovery factor at OMB discount rate for 
26 years)
PCC EUAC = PCC contract bid amount + lane rental + future PCC 
maintenance costs (capital recovery factor at OMB discount rate for 
26 years)
Michigan
Adjustment factor Adjustment factor = NPW future asphalt rehab – PW future concrete 
rehab
Low bidder = lower of (PCC bid price) versus (HMA bid price + 
adjustment factor)
(Assuming asphalt has higher NPW M&R costs)
Missouri
LCC advantage Low bidder = lower of (PCC bid price + NPW future concrete M&R) 
versus (HMA bid price + NPW future HMA M&R)
Ontario
A – D (alternative 
differential) bidding
Adjustment factor = fixed value set by DOT for each project
Low bidder = lower of (PCC bid price- adjustment factor) versus HMA 
bid price
(Assuming asphalt has higher NPW M&R costs)
Iowa
No adjustment Low bidder = lower of PCC bid price versus HMA bid price Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
North Carolina, Ohio, 
West Virginia
Note: NPW = Net Present Worth; EUAC = Equivalent Uniform Annual Cost; OMB = US Office of Management and Budget; M&R = Maintenance and 
Repair.
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adjustment should be applied. Five DOTs (Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, Montana, and Oklahoma) only apply the factor to 
the HMA option, whereas the rest apply it to both options. 
Failing to apply the factor to both options may induce an 
unintentional bias, as one option is being compared on the 
cost of its entire life against the other in which only the con-
struction cost is considered. However, it is not the intention 
of this paper to critique the academic validity of each method. 
It will merely conduct an analysis of outcomes observed 
when each method is applied to the same project.
Analysis and Discussion
The analysis is straightforward. The details of an ADAB proj-
ect that was found in the Special Experimental Project No. 14 
(SEP-14) report series was extracted, and the LCC-adjusted bid 
price was calculated for the same set of bids (18). The project 
was the Shelbyville By-Pass Project in 2006 for construction of 
an overlay and widening of a four-lane concrete pavement in 
Shelby County, Kentucky (18). As this particular project did 
not contain actual data for value of time or lane rental, the A + 
B + C bidding and A + C + lane rental options were not included 
in the analysis. Table 2 contains the results of the analysis, 
which are quite consistent. Regardless of the presence or com-
position of an LCC adjustment factor, the low bidder was the 
same as shown by the tinted line in Table 2 for Bidder B.
The reader must keep in mind that Table 2 applies only to 
the specific project and the market conditions at the time of 
the bid. The relative unit pricing of HMA and PCC pave-
ments move independently of each other and each material 
has its own level of price volatility. Thus, the results cannot 
be generalized. However, a report issued by the Missouri 
DOT found that out of 187 ADAB projects completed 
through 2010, the LCC adjustment factor only reversed the 
decision four times: about 2% of the projects (19). If the 
experience in Missouri is representative of that found in the 
nation, then a result like that shown in Table 2 would be more 
often the rule and, regardless of the composition of the LCC 
adjustment factor, it would not make a difference 98% of the 
time. Thus, it was concluded that, at least in Missouri, com-
peting HMA and PCC head to head can be successfully 
implemented purely on the basis of lowest bid if the Missouri 
DOT chose to do so.
Table 3 attempts to put a broader representation on the 
Table 2 outcome by furnishing the details for 55 ADAB proj-
ects in 13 U.S. states and three Canadian provinces found in 
the literature. For each project, the number of bids submitted 
for each pavement type, the low HMA bid, the low PCC bid, 
the percentage difference between the two bids, and the win-
ning pavement type were tabulated. Not all the bids were 
adjusted by an LCC-based factor because, as stated above, 
several DOTs do not use an adjustment factor and, further-
more, it is known that some agencies, like the Missouri DOT, 
that use a factor do not adjust all the pavement project bids 
(17, 19).
It can be seen in Table 3 that a total of 313 individual bids 
were attracted by ADAB projects, which translates to an 
average of 5.7 bidders per project. According to the litera-
ture, the average number of conventional project bids ranges 
from 3.8 to 5.1 bidders per project (20, 21). Therefore, it 
appears that the sample confirms the individual state results 
in the literature by exceeding the upper bound of the range. 
Next, the sample shows that 44% of the bids were for HMA 
and 56% were for PCC. Although not equal, the difference 
between the two pavement types is not large, supporting the 
idea that implementing ADAB does indeed give both 
Table 2. LCC Adjustment Factor Outcome Analysis
Bid Alt Initial bid
NPW
future costs


















A HMA 29,072,406 827,376 29,072,406 29,899,782 29,899,782 29,899,782 28,245,030 29,072,406
B PCC 25,747,900 356,240 25,747,900 26,104,140 26,104,140 26,104,140 25,391,660 25,747,900
C PCC 27,978,568 356,240 27,978,568 28,334,808 28,334,808 28,334,808 27,622,328 27,978,568
D PCC 29,999,350 356,240 29,999,350 30,355,590 30,355,590 30,355,590 29,643,110 29,999,350
E PCC 43,419,000 356,240 43,419,000 43,775,240 43,775,240 43,775,240 43,062,760 43,419,000
Table 3. Summary of ADAB Project Outcomes Found in the Literature
Outcome Outcome Metric
Total ADAB projects 55 Total bids submitted 313 5.7 bids/project
Total HMA bids submitted 137 No. projects when HMA won 18 33%
Total PCC bids submitted 176 No. projects when PCC won 37 67%
No. projects with no HMA bids submitted 2 Total bids received when HMA won 80 26%
No. projects with no PCC bids submitted 4 Total bids received when PCC won 233 74%
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industries an opportunity to compete. This trend is reinforced 
by the fact that only six of 55 projects (11%) received bids 
for only one pavement type.
The outcomes found in Table 3 show that PCC pavement 
bids won 67% of the time. The unscientific sampling proce-
dure makes it difficult to draw authoritative conclusions 
based on the observed differences, but when combined with 
the results found in Missouri and the Table 2 demonstration 
of the efficacy of the various LCC factors in use, it does 
suggest that the inclusion of an adjustment factor to ensure 
a “level playing field” for PCC may not be needed. As the 
LCC adjustment factor is calculated before advertising an 
ADAB project, the volatility issues discussed in the previ-
ous section come into play as the agency “exercises its 
option” by calculating the factor based on unit prices cur-
rent at the time the bid package is assembled. If the relative 
price swings shown in Figure 1 are possible, then it is not 
illogical to posit that the factor could be calculated when a 
given commodity price is high, and 2 to 3 months later 
when the bids are opened that the trend has reversed itself, 
making the LCC adjustment factor an inaccurate represen-
tation of the relative LCC.
Furthermore, research has repeatedly demonstrated that 
classic LCCA is highly sensitive to the input values that are 
based on professional judgment or assumptions, specifically 
the discount rate, the analysis period, and salvage value (4). 
Stone concludes that “the two sides had completely opposite 
views on the inclusion of price adjustment clauses when cal-
culating initial construction costs and material specific esca-
lation rates” (22). Thus, the composition of the adjustment 
factor itself creates controversy, further muddying the out-
comes to the point that seven different “approved” versions 
of the factor are now in use to account for the same issue. 
When the above discussion is combined with the fact that six 
states do not use bid adjustment factors in their ADAB pro-
grams, it appears that the utility of the LCC-based bid adjust-
ment factor is questionable.
Conclusion
The answer to the research question posed in the section on 
methodology is developed in the following manner:
•• Portland cement and liquid asphalt have different 
rates of volatility and may even change in opposition 
to each other. Those rates have been extreme, a 16% 
swing in 5 months. When the pavement-type selection 
decision is viewed as a business decision in purely 
financial terms, it can be modeled as exercising an 
option in the commodities market, which according to 
standard financial theories becomes more valuable as 
volatility increases. Therefore, ADAB as means to 
“exercise the option” at the last possible moment cre-
ates value for money in and of itself.
•• The controversy between the asphalt and concrete 
paving industries with regard to the proper calcula-
tion of pavement LCCs is both intense and long 
standing. The result is that at least seven different 
algorithms are in use to adjust bid prices in ADAB 
procurements. Some of the methods do not include 
all the elements of the pavement LCCA prescribed by 
the FHWA. Thus, it can be concluded that the current 
suite of different adjustment factors is the product of 
negotiation (16, 17, 21, 23), not hard, scientific engi-
neering economics that should have only a single, 
theoretically correct, method for solving the problem 
used by all (2).
•• The example shown in this paper and the experience 
of the Missouri DOT indicate that even when an 
adjustment factor is applied, it rarely changes the 
award from the lowest priced pavement type. In addi-
tion, the content analysis of ADAB project award out-
comes disproves the perception that asphalt is always 
the lowest price option in that PCC won 67% of the 55 
ADAB projects reported in the literature.
•• Six U.S. states currently let ADAB projects with no 
bid adjustment factors. Of those, the West Virginia 
DOT reported a saving of $16.4 million on six ADAB 
projects (9). The Ohio DOT, based on implementing 
alternate bidding on 10 projects, reported savings of 
$58 million, with the average winning bid price for 
ADAB projects 15% below the engineer’s estimate in 
2009 (23).
Therefore, the research question’s answer is plain. LCC-
based bid adjustment factors do not add value to the ADAB 
process. They add controversy and may unnecessarily com-
plicate a relatively simple process: opening the bids on bid 
day and awarding to the lowest bidder regardless of pave-
ment type (24). The potential for industry opposition may 
have a chilling effect that has stopped some agencies from 
accruing the value inherent to the differential levels of vola-
tility of the two commodities available by treating ADAB as 
an exercisable option in a business rather than as an engi-
neering decision.
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